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Libet-style readiness potentials revisited begins with nature being stubbornly specific, which is often where the best questions begin. In plain language, the datum is this: Libet-style readiness potentials show neural activity preceding some reported decisions, but later work suggests this may reflect stochastic accumulation or preparation rather than a simple disproof of agency. Read it as disciplined contact with nature: the measurement matters, and so do the limits of what the measurement can say. In the scoring table, its main conversation partners are Naturalism (H-NATURALISM), Reductive Physicalism (H-PHYSICALISM-REDUCTIVE), Emergentism (H-EMERGENTISM); that is a map of relevance, not a declaration that the item settles those hypotheses by itself.
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The basic idea is simple: Libet-style readiness potentials show neural activity preceding some reported decisions, but later work suggests this may reflect stochastic accumulation or preparation rather than a simple disproof of agency. That is the thing to notice before the technical labels and numbers arrive.
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Science rows are not shortcuts from a lab result to a worldview. They ask a narrower and more interesting question: what kind of reality makes this pattern, mechanism, or constraint feel expected rather than strange? The answer may help the map, but it should not pretend to be more precise than the evidence allows.
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For mind and consciousness, the key distinction is between explaining what minds do and explaining what experience is like from the inside.
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In the scoring table, this item mainly talks to Naturalism (H-NATURALISM), Reductive Physicalism (H-PHYSICALISM-REDUCTIVE), Emergentism (H-EMERGENTISM), and nearby alternatives. That does not mean the item proves those views true or false; it means the clue leans, however slightly or strongly, in those directions within the model.
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Libet-style readiness potentials show neural activity preceding some reported decisions, but later work suggests this may reflect stochastic accumulation or preparation rather than a simple disproof of agency. The item gives only modest support to naturalized action models.
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Read this as science or mind evidence with scope-limited worldview relevance. Its category path is Science / Consciousness & Mind / Cognitive Neuroscience, which helps set expectations for what kind of question this row can answer.
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This matters because explanations have habits. Some worlds make this clue feel ordinary; others have to work harder to account for it. The Signal tracks that difference without pretending that one row can settle the whole journey.
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Do not panic because the brain prepares before the person reports awareness. Of course embodied agency has neural conditions. A pianist's fingers, habits, and motor system are active before the music is fully named in words; that does not mean there is no pianist.
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The better answer is precise: Libet-style studies modestly support naturalized action models for simple movements, but they do not settle free will, moral responsibility, rational deliberation, or the reality of persons. A Christian account can say that humans act through bodies and brains without reducing the human person to a twitch of machinery.
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The current numerical weight is intentionally bounded: H-NATURALISM: +0.03 log10BF; H-PHYSICALISM-REDUCTIVE: +0.02 log10BF; H-EMERGENTISM: +0.02 log10BF; H-GOD: 0.00 log10BF; H-IDEALISM: 0.00 log10BF. In ordinary language, this row changes the angle of the map; it does not carry the whole argument on its back.
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Use the citation list attached to this evidence item for source audit. No additional publication details are implied beyond those existing citations.
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